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Abstract--- Due to the sensitivity of the Wireless Sensor 
Networks (WSN) applications and resource constraints, 
authentication and key management emerge as a challenging 
issue for WSN.  In general, various approaches have been 
developed for the key management in WSN. This paper has 
come up with a new robust key pre-distribution scheme using 
random polynomial functions and matrix. This new proposed 
scheme significantly increases the storage efficiency and 
provides resilience to network against node capture by using 
random prime numbers, polynomial functions and matrix 
properties. The effectiveness of the scheme is demonstrated 
through a security analysis and comparison with the existing 
schemes. 
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I. Introduction 
Nowadays, Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are 
increasingly used for large range of military and civilian 
applications, including environmental monitoring, target 
tracking, agricultural irrigation, battlefield surveillance 
and scientific exploration. In particular, most of these 
critical applications require sensor nodes to be deployed in 
unattended and adversarial environments [1]. Therefore, 
secure data transferring is an essential issue in these 
applications. In WSNs, data are transmitted by wireless 
communications. This makes them vulnerable to attacks, 
such as eavesdropping, impersonation and modification of 
data [2]. Hence, an efficient key management scheme 
should be used to achieve data confidentiality, integrity 
and authentication between communicating parties.  
On the other hand, the sensors are tiny devices which 
have limited energy source, small memory footprint, 
limited processing power and communication capabilities. 
So, key management schemes like trusted server and 
public-key based methods used in other networks are not 
suitable paradigms for securing exchange in WSN [3].  As 
a result, key management schemes should be paid more 
attention in wireless sensor networks.  
In this work, our aim is to propose an efficient key 
pre-distribution scheme for efficiently securing 
communication and resilience of the network, named as 
Matrix-based Pairwise Key Management Scheme 
(MPKMS). Our scheme is based on random function pre-
distribution. It uses polynomial function and matrix to 
ensure better security. 
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section II presents some key management schemes in 
WSN. Defintions and notations are described in Section 
III, then followed by Section IV that discusses the 
proposed scheme. Section V describes the detailed 
performance analysis and comparison. In Section VI, we 
end up this paper with some conclusions. 
 
II. Related Work 
There are a lot of ongoing researches on key 
management in wireless sensor network. A basic approach 
is to preload a single master key to all sensor nodes, and 
any pair of nodes uses this global master key to establish a 
secure communication link between them. This approach 
has very low network resilience, because if an adversary 
captures a node, the security of the entire network is 
compromised [4]. 
Another approach is to use distinct pair-wise keys for 
all possible pairs of sensors in the network. Although this 
solution has very good resilience against attacks, but it is 
impractical to stores all the keys on each sensor and it is 
not scalable for large WSNs [5].  
Eschenauer and Glior [6] proposed a random key pre-
distribution scheme, which addresses the redundancy in 
previous scheme and yet provides good key resilience. The 
base station first generates a large pool S of keys. Then   
keys is randomly selected from the key pool and stored in 
each node, which is called the node’s key ring (Fig.1). 
This scheme consists of three phases as follows: 
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Phase I: (the initialization). Each sensor is pre-loaded 
with a key ring from S. the number of keys in the key pool 
and key rings are chosen such that the intersection of two 
key rings is not empty with some probability P. 
Phase II: (the discovery of shared key). After 
deployment, sensors broadcast the list of key identifiers 
that they maintain. Neighboring nodes can check whether 
they have a common key in their key ring. Then they can 
use shared key to create safe communication channels. 
Phase III: (The setup of path key). If sensors cannot 
find common keys from their key rings, they can set up 
path key with the nodes in their neighbors. 
 
Node
Key ring 
(k)
Key pool 
(S)
1 N. ..
Selecting  k 
keys 
randomly 
from S
Storing  
them in the 
memory of 
sensors
. ..
 
Figure 1. The process of key distribution. 
 
In this approach, if the sensor nodes are progressively 
captured, the attacker may discover a large part of the 
pool. 
Chan et al. [7] proposed a key pre-distribution scheme 
called Q-composite, in which the amount of key overlap 
required in the discovery of shared key phase. It means 
that two neighboring nodes require at least Q keys to 
establish a secure link. This approach improves resilience 
against node capture, because the attacker needs to 
compromise many more nodes in order to break a secure 
link. But it is not guarantee to find shared key between any 
two nodes because of the need for sharing Q common keys 
instead of one. 
In [8] and [9], the authors applied combinatorial 
design for key pre-distribution based on Symmetric 
Balanced Incomplete Block Design (SBIBD). The system 
generates k= m + 1 key rings from key pool of      
  keys. In this scheme each pair of nodes share exactly 
one common key. However, it is not scalable in large 
networks. 
Liu and Ning in [10] proposed to use symmetric 
bivariate polynomials (f(x, y) = f(y, x)) instead of keys. 
Sensor nodes can generate a common group key by 
evaluating these polynomials. This approach enhances 
resilience against node captured by computing distinct 
secret keys, but it increases the memory usage and the 
computational overhead. 
Blom [11] proposed a  -secure symmetric key 
generation that uses a public matrix          and a private 
symmetric matrix         . The scheme keys are secure if 
no more than   nodes are compromised. Then, the matrix 
of pairwise keys of node   is         Yu and Guan 
[12] used Blom’s scheme and introduced a key pre-
distribution scheme for WSN. The introduced scheme, 
sensor nodes are deployed into a grid and a distinct secret 
matrix is assigned to each group. 
 
III. Preliminaries 
This section gives a brief description of preliminaries 
and various concepts used in this paper. 
 
1. Network Model: We assume that deployment 
region is logically divided into    equal-size sub areas. 
The whole network is composed of a large number of 
static wireless sensor nodes, cluster heads and a single 
base station. Sensor nodes are deployed into sensor 
field uniformly. They also partitioned into t groups 
(clusters), with   
 
  
 nodes in each cluster (Fig. 2).  
Sensor nodes have constrained resources such as 
limited computational, memory, bandwidth and short 
radio transmission range. They only can communicate 
with base station and nodes in other clusters via cluster 
heads in order to reduce energy consumption in the 
network. Cluster heads are equipped with more energy 
resources than sensors. 
Once an adversary captures a node, it can obtain 
all of the nodes credential information like keys, 
identity, etc. 
 
Sensor node
Cluster Head
Base station
 
Figure 2. The structure of the network. 
 
2. Notations: Table 1 gives notations used in this paper. 
 
Table 1. Notation in this paper. 
Notation Description 
  The number of nodes in a WSN. 
  The number of sensor nodes in one cluster. 
   The number of clusters in network. 
    Identity of node j. 
   Random number generated by node j. 
      The number of function k. 
    Session key between node i and j. 
    Massage Atentication Code. 
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    The ith row of matrix     
 
 
IV. Definition of Proposed Pre-distribution Key 
Management scheme 
In this section, we present a pairwise polynomial-
based key management scheme using matrix for WSN, 
which is done in 3 phases. 
 
Phase. 1 System Setup 
In the following, we describe the Initial information 
distribution process of the proposed scheme.  
 
Step I (polynomial pool generation). The base station 
first randomly generates a large pool of bivariate t-degree 
polynomials over the finite field    with unique Id for each 
of polynomials, where t is the degree of polynomial and q 
is a large prime number to accommodate a cryptographic 
key as shown in Eq.1.  
 
             
                        (Eq.1) 
  
These polynomials have a property that the number of 
compromised nodes is less than t [13]. 
Each cluster head receives a subset of polynomials 
from the pool before deployment. The distribution should 
be in such a way that any pair of clusters can discover at 
least one common function. 
 
Step II (symmetric matrix formation). In this step, a 
symmetric matrix A with a size of             is 
generated, where N is the maximum number of nodes that 
are deployed in the cluster. We calculate this matrix as 
follow: 
1. At first, a prim number is generated for each sensor 
node with unique identity i, using Euler’s function. It 
gets a random generated number    as input and 
produces a prim number.  
2. Then the cluster heads calculate a share of 
         that is                  
   
  
          , 
i, j= 1,…, N, where H(            is the element in 
the ith row and jth column of matrix  . 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
                                       
                                       
                                      
                                       
                                        
 
 
 
 
 
 
As                , the generated matrices are 
symmetric. Therefore         , where     is the element 
in the ith row and jth column of the matrix. 
 
 Step III (key pre-distribution). For every sensor node 
a subset of generated matrices is selected. Then one row 
from each matrix         is pre-loaded to that node 
based on its identity. 
 
                                              
 
Here i is the index of matrix row and k is the function 
number. Matrix distribution should be in such a way that 
any pair of nodes can discover at least one common 
function. 
 The description can be better completed with the help 
of an example. Fig. 3 illustrates an example of a simple 
network. Suppose the calculated matrices for the first 
cluster are as follow: 
 
    
                    
                    
                    
  
 
    
                   
                    
                      
  
 
    
                    
                    
                     
  
 
We choose a subset of matrices and load to nodes. For 
example,     and     the second rows of them to node 1, 
where     is the ith rows of matrix j. Then,              are 
assigned to node 2. The first row in each matrix is 
allocated to the cluster head. 
 
                                                       
 
                                                      
 
CH1
1 2
BS
...
 
Figure 3. An example of key Pre-distribution. 
 
Phase. 2 Session Key Establishment  
For pairwise key establishment between two sensor 
nodes, the nodes perform key discovery phase to find out 
with which of their neighbors they share a key. This is 
done according to the following steps. 
 
Step I: After sensor nodes are deployed, they first 
exchange HELLO message containing their identity. 
 
                                     
 
Step II: The node j receives the row vector from its 
neighbors, and then it calculates      that is computed as 
follow: 
1. Node j first generates a random number   . Then it 
calculates the m-dimensional vector R by combining 
   with the receiving    from its neighbor. 
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2. After obtaining R, it calculates Vir by operating dot 
product of two vector     and               is 
vector of shared function’s values between two 
nodes.  
  
                
                       
To obtain the values of vector    , node j should find 
the common functions with node i. Then it refers to the 
ith element of its    , for all              that k is the 
shared functions between them. Let               be 
the shared functions, then     is: 
   = (                             ) 
 
As         are symmetric matrices, we always have 
                           So, the ith element of 
                   is always equal to the jth element of 
                 . 
Now, node j responds with an ACK message as shown 
in the following: 
  
                                      
 
Step III: After receiving the message by node i, it can 
calculate    with having the value of   . Then node i 
obtains      by performing a dot production of      and 
  . If    
     , then j is an authorized node and 
       
        
To illustrate how to calculate    , consider the 
previous example shown in Fig. 3. After sensor nodes are 
deployed, node 1 and node 2 begin to exchange HELLO 
messages as follow: 
 
                        
                        
 
When node 2 receives the message from node 1, it 
checks the number of function in common with it. In this 
example the only function is 5; therefore vector      has 
one element in this example. As the index of node 1 in 
matrix    is 2, node 2 should refer to the second element 
of its vector                .  
 
                 
 
Node 2 sends a message in responding the HELLO 
message: 
 
                         
 
After this message is received by node 1, it can 
calculate         and obtains the value of     , which is 
the third element of vector     (          . As 
mentioned previously,         are symmetric matrices 
and        .  
 
            
               
So, 
H                   . 
 
Step IV: Now, node i should authenticates itself to 
node j. So, it sends a message authentication code (MAC) 
message containing its identity, a random generated key K 
and    encrypted by    . This message allows j to verify 
the validity of node i.   
 
                        
 
V. Performance Analysis 
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the 
proposed scheme and compare it with other methods. 
 
1. Security Analysis 
In fact, sensor nodes may be deployed into hostile 
environment, where an adversary may physically capture 
one or more sensor nodes. If a node is captured by an 
adversary, the credential key information kept in the node 
might be exposed. As a result, adversaries may 
compromise the connection of these nodes and some extra 
connections secured by these keys. The number of 
connections that are affected by node capturing is defined 
as the resilience against node capture.  
In the propsed scheme, the base station selects a 
subset of polynomials from the large polynomial pool 
randomly and assigns them to the cluster heads. Then, a 
prim number is generated by Euler’s function and a share 
of these polynomials is computed for any pair of nodes in 
each cluster. For each node a subset of hashed shares is 
stored before deployment.  
In MPKMS        is calculated locally by sensor 
nodes, but is not directly exchanged between nodes. 
Hence, an adversary is not able to listen to the traffic load 
and able to extract the key     . Once a key is 
compromised, only one communication is affected (two 
nodes). Let us consider that    denotes the number of 
compromised node in each cluster and   is the average 
number of clusters. Thus, the number of vulnerable nodes 
is         Fig 4 shows the number of affected nodes 
for different values of. 
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Figure 4. Number of vulnerable nodes for different  . 
 
2. Analysis of network connectivity: 
The aim of connectivity in a network is to securely 
transfer data from one node to another. This secure 
transfer may depends on communication range and 
security mechanisms. 
As mentioned previously, the nodes are deployed into 
a grid and to each cluster is assigned a distinct polynomial 
pools. The ddistribution is conducted in such a way that 
each pool has at least a function in common with other 
CH’s pools. Also, for each node there exists at least one 
node that has a common function with it in the cluster. 
With this scheme, any pair of nodes can always compute a 
common key to communicate together. Therefore, 
probability of having two nodes with no function in 
common is zero. So, the proposed scheme achieves 100% 
connectivity. 
In EG scheme, connectivity is computed as follow: 
 
        
            
         
 
                         
(Eq.2) 
 
Where    is the size of key pool and each node stores 
k keys. In [14] the distribution is not uniform, thus    is 
obtained by the following equality. 
  
         
            
          
 
(Eq.3) 
 
Where    is the number of assigned keys to the cluster 
heads. Fig 5 shows a comparison of network connectivity 
in above schemes. 
 
Figure 5. Connectivity of the network. 
  
3. Memory analysis: 
WSN has constraint storage resources. The proposed 
scheme reduces the storage cost effectively. The overall 
memory consumption in the network is equal to the sum of 
the memory usage in nodes and cluster heads. 
As mentioned previously, each sensor node has     
rows of q matrixes. In each row, we have     share 
of        . Let    be the number of clusters in network 
and   be the maximum number of node that can be 
deployed in the cluster, the total memory usage is: 
 
            
           (Eq.4) 
  
 
Where    is the number of bits that are required to 
store a share of         and   is the average number of 
rows that is pre-loaded to each node.   
For cluster heads, we need to store k matrixes, where 
  is the number of function assigned to that cluster. The 
matrix has               elements and each of that 
needs      storage resource. So, the total memory 
needed in clusters is: 
 
           
          (Eq.5) 
 
Therefore, total memory required in network is: 
 
                       
 
                                         
                                                                              
 
In [10], each sensor node has to store   polynomial. if 
sensor nodes require            bits to store each 
polynomial, the overall storage overhead is    . . A 
graphical comparison of these schemes is shown in Fig 6.  
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Figure 6. Effect of node number in usage overhead. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
In this paper, a new design of matrix based pairwise 
key pre-distribution using deployment knowledge is 
proposed.  The deployment region is partition into equal-
size grids and symmetric matrices is used for pre-
distributing process of keys. Security is improved 
significantly by random selection of polynomials and 
prime number generation. This work also achieves a 
higher degree of connectivity and a lower storage 
overhead compared to existing schemes.  
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